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Abstract 
From a sample of publicly-traded banks in the Asia-Pacific region over the 1998-2012 period, 
we document that banks with higher charter value are able to insulate themselves from 
systemic risk by acquiring more capital. Nevertheless, we find that the self-disciplining role 
of bank charter value is more pronounced for countries with lower depth of credit information 
sharing. Our results also show that in countries with lower quality of private credit bureaus, 
higher charter value enhances capitalization, and alleviates systemic risk in banking. Overall, 
these findings suggest that higher bank charter value might be detrimental to systemic 
stability for countries where the credit reporting system is of better quality.  
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1. Introduction 
The relationship between bank competition and financial stability has become a 
considerable issue across the world, notably in the aftermath of the 2008 global financial 
crisis (e.g. Beck, 2008; Acharya and Richardson, 2009; Anginer, et al., 2013; Fu et al., 2014). 
On the one hand, financial deregulation that spurs bank competition is perceived as one of the 
triggers of financial crises, as banks in a more competitive market tend to behave imprudently 
in response to a decline in charter value. Such a hypothesis has been acknowledged  by a 
large number of studies in  the so-called “charter value” literature (e.g. Marcus, 1984; Keeley, 
1990; Matutes and Vives, 1996; Demsetz et al., 1996; Beck et al., 2006; Fungacova et al., 
2009; Ariss, 2010; Allen and Gale, 2004). On the other hand, several studies point out that it 
is higher bank competition that enhances financial stability. Banks in a less competitive 
market tend to charge higher lending rates, which in turn exacerbates borrowers’ moral 
hazard and bank riskiness. These latter studies are classified in the “competition-stability” 
literature (e.g. Boyd and De Nicolo, 2005; Boyd et al., 2006; Uhde and Heimeshoff, 2009; 
Liu et al., 2012; Soedarmono et al., 2013; Fu et al., 2014). 
In light of this debate, Berger et al. (2009) highlight that the “charter value” and the 
“competition-stability” views are not necessarily conflicting hypotheses. While higher bank 
market power results in an increase in non-performing loans according to the “competition-
stability” literature, higher bank market power is also associated with higher capital ratios and 
lower insolvency risk according to the “charter value” literature. In this context, the adverse 
impact of bank market power on credit risk can be offset by higher capital ratios and thus, 
bank insolvency risk could remain unaffected.  
In parallel, in spite of the importance of preserving bank-level soundness, the 2008 
global financial meltdown also highlights increasing needs to prevent the contagion of bank 
failures and the buildup of bank systemic risk (Arnold et al., 2013). Although there is no 
formal definition of bank systemic risk, it is widely accepted that bank systemic risk is 
associated with the comovement of bank risk taking. For instance, Adrian and Brunnermeier 
(2011) measure bank systemic risk by computing the comovement of banks’ value at risk 
(VaR), while Anginer et al. (2014) consider the comovement of banks’ distance-to-default. 
Very few studies have looked into the impact of bank competition on systemic risk. 
Anginer et al. (2014) document from a sample of publicly traded banks across 63 countries 
that higher bank market power leads to higher systemic risk. In a similar vein, a closely 
related work by De Nicolo and Kwast (2002) consider the correlations of bank stock returns 
to proxy bank systemic risk  to assess the impact of bank consolidations through mergers, but 
do not explicitly study the effect of market power on systemic risk.   
Aside from the adverse impact of bank competition, systemic financial crises could 
also be caused by asymmetric information problems (Mishkin, 1991; Sau, 2003). For such 
reasons, a growing literature advocates the importance of credit information sharing to cope 
with information asymmetry that aggravates bank riskiness (i.e. the “information sharing-
stability” literature)1. Doublas-Madrid and Minetti (2013) argue that credit information 
sharing affects bank stability through at least three channels, such as borrowers’ moral 
hazard, banks’ moral hazard and adverse selection.  
Concerning the first channel, borrowers’ moral hazard may decline with better credit 
information sharing as a disciplining mechanism of borrowers (Jappelli and Pagano, 2002). 
The second channel builds on Rajan (1992) in which the role of bank moral hazard is 
particularly highlighted. Specifically, banks may exploit private information about 
borrowers’ quality in order to hold back credit and take rents from borrowers (i.e. “hold-up” 
problems). In the presence of credit information sharing mechanisms, banks are allowed ex 
ante to share information with other banks about the quality of borrowers. Such mechanisms 
therefore reduce the market power of banks over borrowers’ information, and the “hold-up” 
problems as part of bank moral hazard could be mitigated. Finally, the third channel relates to 
the fact that banks could avoid granting loans to riskier borrowers due to the adverse 
selection problem. 
In spite of a growing literature on credit information sharing, there are no studies 
focused on the link between credit information sharing and bank systemic risk. Prior 
literature only examines the impact of credit information sharing on bank riskiness and 
lending. For example, Jappelli and Pagano (2002) show that from a credit bureau survey in 
49 countries, countries with public and private credit registries exhibit higher bank lending 
activities and lower credit risk. Love and Mylenko (2003) differentiate private credit bureaus 
from public credit registries, and show that the role of credit bureaus in reducing firms’ 
financing constraints is more pronounced for private credit bureaus than public credit 
registries. Brown et al. (2009) highlight that higher information sharing increases bank loan 
availability and reduces the cost of intermediation, although such effects are more 
pronounced for opaque firms, and for countries with a relatively weaker legal system. 
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 Pagaon and Jappelli (1993) specifically shed light on the role of credit reporting system (i.e. credit bureaus) as 
a proxy of credit information sharing that alleviates information asymmetry, because credit bureaus enable 
banks and other creditors to routinely share information on the creditworthiness of borrowers. 
Eventually, higher credit information sharing reduces bank riskiness, enhances bank 
profitability and boosts economic growth (Houston et al., 2010). 
In relation to the “competition-stability” literature following Boyd and De Nicolo 
(2005), asymmetric information problems indeed contribute to influence how bank 
competition affects risk taking. Nevertheless, only Beck et al. (2013) incorporate the role of 
credit information sharing in affecting the nexus between bank competition and risk taking. 
They find that greater bank moral hazard in response to fiercer competition  plays a crucial 
role in exacerbating bank default risk, especially for countries with better credit information 
sharing. In this regard, better credit information sharing can facilitate banks to choose risky 
loans that generate higher profits, but greater competition drives banks to loosen lending 
standards (e.g. Ogura, 2006; González and González, 2008). Taken together, stronger 
competition and better credit information sharing are detrimental to bank stability.   
In parallel, another strand of literature shows that information sharing can influence 
the degree of bank competition. Specifically, Bouckaert and Degryse (2006) provide a 
theoretical contribution by differentiating “good borrowers” and “bad borrowers” in 
examining how information sharing through credit registries affects bank competition. In 
their model, better credit information sharing enables some banks to gain market power by 
acquiring necessary information from the market, and by not releasing their own credit 
information to other competitors for strategic reasons. In this sense, better credit information 
will increase the market power of several banks, which in turn increases the moral hazard of 
good borrowers. In other words, an increase in the number of bad borrowers in the credit 
market may in turn affect bank stability. 
 From the aforementioned studies, credit information sharing and bank competition 
might arguably be interrelated in affecting bank riskiness and its correlation. This paper 
contributes to prior literature by examining the joint-impact of bank charter value and credit 
information sharing on bank systemic risk instead of individual bank risk. Concomitantly, we 
also examine the joint-impact of bank charter value and credit information sharing on bank 
capitalization, as the link between bank competition and systemic risk is dependent on how 
banks manage their capital in response to competition pressures (Berger et al., 2009). We 
thus reveal how credit information sharing may strengthen or temper the impact of bank 
charter value on systemic risk and capitalization.  
To the best of our knowledge, this paper is the first to establish a bridge between the 
“competition-stability” and the “information sharing-stability” literature by specifically 
analyzing its implications on bank systemic risk and capitalization. As further contributions, 
unlike Anginer et al. (2014) that use the correlation of bank distance-to-default to measure 
systemic risk, we focus on the correlation of bank idiosyncratic risk and stock returns to 
proxy systemic risk following previous studies (e.g. De Nicolo and Kwast, 2002, Patro et al., 
2013). In order to assess credit information sharing, we consider the role of credit reporting 
systems (e.g. Pagano and Jappelli, 1993; Jappelli and Pagano, 2002; Houston et al.; 2010; 
Tsai et al., 2011; Beck et al., 2013). However, instead of merely considering a depth of credit 
information index as in Beck et al. (2013), we also consider the quality of private credit 
bureaus and public credit registries,  
A sample of publicly traded commercial banks in the Asia-Pacific region is retrieved 
to tackle the issues raised in this paper. We select the Asia-Pacific region for several reasons. 
First, the banking sector remains a major source of external financing for private sector in the 
Asia-Pacific region  (Adams, 2008; Moshirian, 2009; Agusman et al., 2008; Soedarmono et 
al., 2013). Hence, overcoming bank systemic risk is critical to ensure that financial 
intermediation works properly to spur economic growth without exacerbating financial 
instability. Second, the Asian banking industry has experienced substantial changes in the 
aftermath of the 1997 crisis due to bank consolidation and a rapid growth of foreign direct 
investments in banking (e.g. Moshirian, 2009; Santoso, 2009). Consequently, assessing the 
issue of bank competition due to a growing consolidation in banking is particularly relevant 
for the Asia-Pacific region. 
Among the existing studies on bank competition and stability in the Asian context Fu 
et al. (2014) examine how bank competition and concentration affect bank default risk from 
14 countries in the Asia-Pacific region. Liu et al. (2012) also examine the link between 
competition and risk taking in Southeast Asian banks, while Soedarmono et al. (2013) 
investigate the impact of competition on capital ratios and risk-taking behavior in Asian 
banks by taking into account the effect of financial crisis and “too-big-to-fail” issues. Some 
studies also incorporate Asian banks as part of their sample, but the issue of bank systemic 
risk remains unexplored in the Asian context (e.g. Boyd et al., 2006; Berger et al., 2009; Behr 
et al., 2010; Schaeck et al., 2009; Ariss, 2010; Schaeck and Cihák, 2012).  
To this end, the remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes 
our data, variables and methodology. Section 3 discusses our empirical findings, while 
Section 4 provides some robustness checks and Section 5 concludes the paper.  
 
 
 
2. Data, variables and methodology 
2.1. Data description 
Our dataset comes from various sources. We focus on publicly traded commercial 
banks and thus retrieve Asia-Pacific banks’ balance-sheet and income statement data over the 
1998-2012 period from BankScope Fitch IBCA. Hence, our bank sample consists of 173 
publicly traded banks from China (17), Japan (78), Hong Kong (4), South Korea (3), 
Indonesia (31), Malaysia (3), Philippines (12), Singapore (3), Thailand (10) and Taiwan 
(12)
2
. Moreover, we also retrieve bank stock price and market index data from Thomson 
Reuters Datastream. 
Meanwhile, data regarding credit reporting systems are collected from the Doing 
Business database developed by the World Bank. Doing Business 2004-2014 provides data 
on the country’s credit reporting system each year in January from 2003 to 2013. Hence, we 
consider that such information reflects the condition at the end of each year from 2002 to 
2012
3
. Following Tsai et al. (2011), because data on the credit reporting system before 2002 
is not available, we use the data in 2002 for the earlier time period (1998-2001). Moreover, 
we also consider country-specific factors likely to influence bank systemic risk. These 
include stock market volatility (MVOL) and stock market capitalization (MCAP) retrieved 
from the Global Financial Development database provided by the World Bank.  
 
2.2. Dependent variables 
 This paper considers two dependent variables comprising bank systemic risk and 
capitalization. Our focus here is to assess whether the impact of bank charter value on 
systemic risk can be partly explained by the extent to which bank capital ratios are affected 
by bank charter value.  
 To measure bank systemic risk, we consider two proxies consisting of the correlation 
of bank idiosyncratic risk (SRISK), and the correlation of bank stock returns (RCORR). 
Moreover, in order to assess bank capitalization, we consider two measures of bank capital 
ratios commonly used in prior literature on bank capitalization (e.g. Soedarmono et al., 2013; 
Berger et al., 2009; Schaeck et al., 2012). Specifically, we use the ratio of total equity to total 
assets (EQTA) and the ratio of total capital to total risk-weighted assets (CAR). 
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 The numbers in parentheses represent the number of bank sample for each country. 
3
 Tsai et al. (2011) use the similar consideration in dealing with data on the credit reporting system across 
countries. 
 With regards to the correlation of bank idiosyncratic risk (SRISK), we proceed in three 
stages. In the first stage, we construct a single-index market model as follows: 
 titMti
RR ,,,              (1) 
Ri,t  is the stock return of bank i at week t, while RM,t is the weekly stock market return. We 
calculate the bank stock return and the market return as follows: 
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From Equation (2), p and m stand for the bank stock price and the market index, respectively. 
In the second stage, we estimate Eq. (1) using OLS (ordinary least squares) regression on the 
basis of a 52-period rolling window. Hence, we consider the standard market model as in Eq. 
(1) for each bank i at week t computed from t – 51 up to t. In the third stage, we retrieve the 
residual of Eq. (1) and construct an exponentially weighted moving average correlation 
between the residual of bank i (
ti , ) and that of bank j ( tj , ) which is calculated from t – 51 
up to t using the following equation: 
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  In Eq. (3), we set k equal to 51. According to Engle (2002), Equation (3) denotes the 
exponential smoother which is also the simplest specification for the correlation matrix. As 
documented by Engle (2002), RiskMetrics also uses the exponential smoother with declining 
weights based on a parameter λ. In a moving average correlation, this parameter is necessary 
to represent that current data has no fixed termination point in the past until it becomes 
uninformative (Engle, 2002). We follow RiskMetrics and Engle (2002) to set 94.0 . 
Eventually,   is the average weekly correlation between bank i’s idiosyncratic risk with the 
idiosyncratic risk of other banks j within each country.  
  Because our study analyzes the impact of bank charter value on systemic risk based 
on annual balance-sheet and income statement data, we therefore annualize  to obtain the 
degree of bank systemic risk that varies from one year to another (SRISK). Hence, SRISK is 
considered as a measure of annual bank systemic risk. Higher SRISK reflects that banks have 
greater exposure to contagion risk due to other banks’ default risk within each country.  
  Alternatively, we also incorporate another measure of systemic risk based on bank 
stock returns following De Nicolo and Kwast (2002). We thus construct an exponentially 
weighted moving average correlation using Eq. (3), but we use bank stock return data instead 
of the residuals of the standard market model. We denote this specification using RCORR, 
where its interpretation is similar to SRISK. 
 
2.3. Explanatory variables of interest 
As explanatory variables of interest, we have a measure of bank charter value and 
several proxies of credit information sharing activities. In order to measure bank charter value 
that reflects bank market power, we follow Keeley (1990) and Haq and Heaney (2012) using  
the Tobin’s Q ratio which is defined as follows:  
𝑇𝑂𝐵𝐼𝑁 =
𝑀𝑉𝐸 + 𝐵𝑉𝐿
𝑇𝐴
 
MVE denotes the market value of equity, while BVL and TA represent the book value of 
liabilities and total assets, respectively. Because bank charter value represents the market 
power of banks, banks operating a less competitive market tend to have a higher charter value 
(TOBIN).  
Concerning credit information sharing that could alleviate asymmetric information 
issues within each country, we consider variables representing the quality of the credit 
reporting system. These include the depth of credit information index (CRINDEX), private 
credit bureau coverage (PRIVBUR) and the public credit registry coverage (PUBREG). 
CRINDEX ranges from 0 to 6 and measures the degree of credit information available for 
each country. A higher CRINDEX means higher information sharing, because more credit 
information from credit bureaus is available to support bank lending decisions. In the 
meantime, PRIVBUR and PUBREG describe the proportion of individuals and firms listed by 
private credit bureaus and public credit registries, respectively. Information covered by these 
credit registries includes repayment history, unpaid debts and credit outstanding. Higher 
PRIVBUR and PUBREG are both associated with better information sharing.  
 
2.4. Control variables  
  Moreover, we introduce a set of control variables that are bank specific and country 
specific. For bank-specific control variables, we consider the ratio of liquid assets to deposits 
and short-term funds (LIQUID), the cost-to-income ratio (CTI), the ratio of total loans to total 
assets (LTA), and the logarithm of bank total assets (SIZE). For country-specific variables, we 
incorporate the growth rate of real gross domestic product (GROWTH), the stock market 
volatility index (MVOL), and the ratio of stock market capitalization to GDP (MCAP).  
 
2.5. Methodology  
We proceed with the analysis in three stages. First, we estimate the degree of bank 
systemic risk obtained from Eq. (1) to Eq. (3). Second, we investigate the impact of bank 
charter value on systemic risk and capitalization. In the third stage, we expand the analysis by 
incorporating the interaction term between TOBIN and credit information sharing variables 
(i.e. TOBIN x CRINDEX; TOBIN x PRIVBUR; or TOBIN x PUBREG) to examine the 
combined effect of bank charter value and credit information sharing on bank systemic risk 
and capitalization.  
In terms of the econometric specification, previous studies on bank performance 
suggest that the current bank performance is affected by its past values because of managerial 
reasons (Naceur and Kandil, 2009; Naceur and Omran, 2011; Soedarmono and Tarazi, 2013). 
Arguably, bank systemic risk and capitalization as the dependent variables are also affected 
by their past values. Hence, the use of a dynamic panel data model that incorporates the past 
values of the dependent variables (i.e. bank systemic risk or capitalization) as independent 
variables is particularly relevant. Using a dynamic panel data methodology is also essential to 
control for possible endogeneity issues documented in the literature on the nexus between 
bank competition and financial stability (Gonzales, 2005; Schaeck & Cihák, 2007; Uhde and 
Heimeshoff, 2009; Soedarmono et al., 2011). 
In estimating the dynamic panel data model, we follow Arellano and Bover (1995) 
and Blundell and Bond (1998). In this regard, we use the two-step generalized methods of 
moments (GMM) estimator or the System GMM. The System GMM is the extension of the 
Standard GMM by Arellano and Bond (1991), where the level equation is combined with the 
first-difference equation to create more efficient outputs than the Standard GMM (Baltagi, 
2005). By utilizing the System GMM, this study therefore controls for various sources of 
endogeneity, for instance  dynamic, fixed effects and simultaneity in the variables (Pathan 
and Faff, 2013). 
In estimating the System GMM, we consider the finite sample correction by 
Windmeijer (2005) to provide a robust estimated coefficient. Because our models contain an 
autoregressive variable, we also perform orthogonal deviation transformations of instruments 
to control for bank-level fixed effects. Nevertheless, for robustness considerations,  we also 
report the empirical results obtained when using the first-difference transformation of 
instruments. Eventually, the dynamic panel data models are valid when the AR(2) test and 
Hansen-J test are both not significant. When the AR(2) test is not rejected, it indicates that no 
second-order autocorrelation among residuals of first-differenced equation can be found. 
Similarly, when the Hansen-J test is not rejected, it means that the identifying restrictions in 
our models are valid. 
 
3. Empirical results  
In Table 1, we provide descriptive statistics of our variables after imposing several 
restrictions to eliminate possible outliers that may affect our empirical results. Specifically, 
we exclude CAR values that are lower than -1 and higher than 1. We also exclude LTA values 
that are lower than 0 and higher than 1, because LTA should range between 0 and 1. In 
addition to that, we also exclude zero values in all variables used in this study. Moreover, 
Table 2 presents the correlations of all the variables used to analyze the link between bank 
charter value, credit information sharing and systemic risk. On the whole, the independent 
variables used in this study are not strongly correlated. Hence, multicollinearity issues should 
be less of a concern.  
 
[Insert Table 1 and Table 2 here] 
 
In the next stage, we analyze the impact of bank charter value on systemic risk and 
capitalization as documented in Table 3. Higher bank charter value (TOBIN) is associated 
with lower systemic risk regardless of whether we use SRISK or RCORR as a measure of 
systemic risk. The results also show that banks with higher charter value tend to have higher 
capital ratios measured by either EQTA or CAR. These findings suggest that greater charter 
value enables banks to have higher capital ratios as in Berger et al. (2009). This in turn 
contributes to alleviate bank systemic risk. Overall, these findings are consistent with the 
“charter value” hypothesis in which higher bank market power leads to greater financial 
stability (Fonseca and González, 2010). Our dynamic panel data models are also valid, 
because the AR(2) test and the Hansen-J test are not rejected at least at the 5% level. 
 
[Insert Table 3 here] 
 
Moreover, Table 4, Table 5, and Table 6 present our estimation results when we 
augment our model by introducing the interaction terms between bank charter value (TOBIN) 
and credit information sharing. Credit information sharing is measured by three indicators 
(CRINDEX, PRIVBUR and PUBREG). In this regard, we assess whether the role of charter 
value as a self-disciplining factor of banks in affecting systemic risk and capitalization is 
dependent on the extent to which the country’s credit reporting system is of better quality. 
Overall, our empirical results presented in Table 4, Table 5 and Table 6 are valid, because the 
AR(2) test and the Hansen-J test remain insignificant at least at the 5 percent level. 
In Table 4, we examine the impact of the depth of credit information index 
(CRINDEX) on the link between bank charter value (TOBIN), systemic risk (SRISK or 
RCORR) and capitalization (EQTA or CAR). When bank systemic risk proxies become the 
dependent variables, we document that the negative values of the coefficients of TOBIN are 
higher than the positive values of the coefficients of TOBIN x CRINDEX. As such, the self-
disciplining role of bank charter value in reducing systemic risk is more pronounced for 
countries with a lower depth of credit information index. However, we do not find any 
significant impact of depth of credit information index on the link between bank charter value 
and capital ratios.  
 
[Insert Table 4 here] 
 
From these findings, bank charter value can substitute the lack of quality of credit 
reporting systems in mitigating bank systemic risk. Similarly, our results suggest that in 
countries with better quality of credit reporting system, higher bank charter value can be 
detrimental to financial stability by increasing bank systemic risk. Such results can be 
explained by the following reasons. As the depth of credit information index increases, 
reflecting higher information sharing, bank competition will decrease (Bouckaert and 
Degryse, 2006). Lower bank competition indicates that the hold-up problems of banks over 
the borrower information increase and hence, “good borrowers” may become “bad 
borrowers”. Such good borrowers’ moral hazard is aggravated when bank charter value also 
increases considerably, because higher bank charter value can already increase risk taking in 
the first place as in the “competition-stability” literature.  
In Table 5, we specifically consider the influence of the degree of credit information 
coverage held by private credit bureaus (PRIVBUR). We find that the negative impact of 
charter value on systemic risk is reversed for the countries with higher coverage of credit 
information held by private credit bureaus (PRIVBUR). The positive coefficients of TOBIN x 
PRIVBUR outweigh the negative coefficients of TOBIN. Phrased differently, the absolute 
value of TOBIN x PRIVBUR coefficients are higher than the absolute values of TOBIN 
coefficients. These results therefore suggest that higher bank charter value is detrimental to 
systemic stability, particularly for countries with better quality of private credit bureaus. 
Meanwhile, bank charter value can also be a self-disciplining factor of bank risk taking that 
alleviates systemic risk, but only when the values taken by PRIVBUR are quite low.  
 
[Insert Table 5 here] 
 
In contrast, our empirical results in Table 6 show that the degree of credit information 
coverage held by public registry bureaus (PUBREG) does not significantly affect the link 
between bank charter value (TOBIN) and systematic risk (SRISK or RCOR).  
 
[Insert Table 6 here] 
 
4. Robustness checks  
In order to further ensure that our results are robust, we also perform several 
robustness checks
4
. First, we modify Eq. (1) to Eq. (8) by including two control variables 
reflecting shareholder protection, which is measured by the ease of shareholder suit index 
(SHLAW) and investor protection index (INVPRO). This regression is also performed using 
the two-step GMM estimator following Arellano and Bover (1995) with both orthogonal 
deviation and first-difference transformation of instruments. Our results regarding the impact 
of TOBIN on bank systemic risk and capitalization as discussed previously are not altered. 
The model also passes the AR(2) test and the Hansen-J test. Moreover, we also check for the 
interaction terms between bank charter value (TOBIN) and credit information sharing 
variables (CRINDEX, PRIVBUR and PUBREG), and find that our overall findings remain the 
same.  
The second robustness test is conducted by taking into account the differences in 
general macroeconomic environments of countries in the Asia-Pacific region. To consider 
this dimension, we thus incorporate country-specific dummy variables as independent 
variables in all models. Again, our main empirical findings are not altered.  
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 The results from these sensitivity analyses are not shown in the paper but are available upon request. 
5. Conclusion 
Using a sample of publicly-traded commercial banks in the Asia-Pacific region over 
the 1998-2012 period, our empirical findings indicate that higher charter value is associated 
with lower systemic risk and higher capitalization in banking. In this regard, higher bank 
charter value enables bank to enhance capitalization, which plays an important role in 
reducing bank systemic risk. Nevertheless, our findings further indicate that in countries with 
better credit information sharing, especially if private credit bureaus are of better quality, 
bank charter value no longer can be a self-disciplining factor that alleviates systemic risk. In 
other words, the impact of bank charter value in reducing systemic risk is more pronounced 
in the environments with lower credit information sharing and lower quality of private credit 
bureaus.  
Our findings therefore provide several policy implications. While better credit 
information sharing and the establishment of private credit bureaus might play an essential 
role in disciplining bank borrowers and mitigating bank riskiness, the role of bank market 
power should also be taken into close considerations, because higher market power is 
detrimental to systemic stability when credit information sharing is of better quality. Hence, 
improving the quality of credit information sharing should therefore be accompanied by 
reforms to enhance bank competition with the ultimate goals of reducing bank systemic risk.  
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Appendix 
Table 1. Summary statistics over the 1998-2012 period 
Variables Description  Mean  Median  Maximum  Minimum  Std. Dev.  Observations 
SRISK Average correlation of bank idiosyncratic risk 0.234593 0.250023 0.681258 -0.232124 0.165418 1979 
RCORR Average correlation of bank stock returns 0.393667 0.429389 0.866503 -0.113587 0.202117 1971 
EQTA Ratio of total equity to total assets 0.068389 0.05736 0.24103 0.00045 0.036322 1823 
CAR Ratio of total capital ratio to risk-weighted assets 0.128066 0.1122 0.8178 -0.7756 0.078969 1749 
TOBIN Tobin's Q ratio 1.015316 0.994238 1.48956 0.867954 0.072461 1646 
LIQUID Ratio of liquid assets to deposits and short-term funds 0.178939 0.09875 5.46154 0.01578 0.235203 1867 
CTI Cost-to-income ratio 0.665896 0.651 8.7358 0.19375 0.392719 1818 
LTA Ratio of total loans to total assets 0.592413 0.6333 0.90006 -0.00019 0.147488 1867 
SIZE Logarithm of bank total assets 16.28897 16.6487 21.6396 10.5768 1.807251 1867 
GROWTH Real growth rate of gross domestic product (GDP) 0.02672 0.021804 0.136051 -0.054188 0.034398 2093 
MVOL Stock market volatility index 0.244676 0.220984 0.532069 0.077704 0.071809 2248 
MCAP Ratio of stock market capitalization to GDP 0.713792 0.620538 5.694619 0.140009 0.605198 2254 
PRIVBUR Private credit bureau coverage 0.424178 0.612 1 0 0.356542 2595 
PUBREG Public credit registries coverage 0.049291 0 1 0 0.131764 2595 
CREDINDEX Depth of credit information index 4.724085 5 6 2 1.475898 2595 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 2. Correlation Matrix 
Variables SRISK RCORR EQTA CAR TOBIN LIQUID CTI LTA SIZE 
SRISK 1 
        RCORR 0.797288298 1 
       EQTA -0.375994734 -0.128339677 1 
      CAR -0.211170404 -0.046686593 0.739954076 1 
     TOBIN -0.349364333 -0.220355995 0.264147778 0.217863097 1 
    LIQUID -0.331473661 -0.223173173 0.393791 0.365691225 0.350464093 1 
   CTI -0.065849281 -0.106878771 -0.192348846 -0.13287864 -0.002145597 0.024734687 1 
  LTA 0.183904819 0.085384281 -0.38915349 -0.491358309 -0.221221962 -0.551579388 -0.055125393 1 
 SIZE 0.602783401 0.616386596 -0.445953953 -0.312420901 -0.189652118 -0.402277969 -0.15135459 0.225856882 1 
GROWTH -0.118467161 0.030766163 0.224848665 0.174088609 0.278164487 0.244099452 -0.156718973 -0.260518941 -0.011704315 
MVOL 0.022010242 0.041881971 0.077587763 -0.002039745 0.055982076 0.101608003 0.023665646 -0.042053576 -0.097016021 
MCAP 0.091149938 0.234848136 -0.068451991 -0.081796789 0.04490625 -0.115327803 -0.110748432 0.095117913 0.304521874 
PRIVBUR 0.414976721 0.286690395 -0.448539696 -0.288475832 -0.439527423 -0.465378445 0.062989591 0.429396507 0.417571436 
PUBREG -0.261155615 -0.155582005 0.266421438 0.172763157 0.329431073 0.232395547 -0.091846437 -0.07124379 -0.150212837 
CREDINDEX 0.432822211 0.262552094 -0.491548594 -0.357964515 -0.409411139 -0.518417632 0.052227433 0.546176804 0.488443221 
SHLAW 0.223354421 0.173813795 -0.378366899 -0.288396148 -0.424803141 -0.466171655 0.047197637 0.366816064 0.431699125 
INVPRO 0.039010617 0.146670192 -0.247049338 -0.203543007 -0.174335428 -0.317516297 0.041466427 0.414033095 0.271708075 
Variables GROWTH MVOL MCAP PRIVBUR PUBREG CREDINDEX SHLAW INVPRO 
GROWTH 1 
       MVOL -0.143387076 1 
      MCAP -0.010395501 -0.108839423 1 
     PRIVBUR -0.54373537 -0.251082082 0.378711373 1 
    PUBREG 0.257184342 0.012004132 -0.028184122 -0.24636465 1 
   CREDINDEX -0.464778334 -0.254394363 0.326974961 0.823336539 -0.053030092 1 
  SHLAW -0.526975968 -0.242013584 0.501594254 0.720733771 -0.325007107 0.733956517 1 
 INVPRO -0.430973901 -0.189220441 0.596319216 0.618356297 -0.07065763 0.630486933 0.60453792 1 
 
 
 
 
Table 3. Bank charter value, systemic risk and capitalization  
  SRISK RCOR EQTA CAR 
  
Orthogonal 
Deviation 
First 
Difference 
Orthogonal 
Deviation 
First 
Difference 
Orthogonal 
Deviation 
First 
Difference 
Orthogonal 
Deviation 
First 
Difference 
Dep.var (-1) 0.62692*** 0.54443*** 0.29156*** 0.26175** 0.75063*** 0.60452*** 0.21351 0.10069 
  (0.061) (0.057) (0.078) (0.105) (0.058) (0.080) (0.150) (0.089) 
TOBIN -0.18942** -0.23843*** -0.31394*** -0.32356*** 0.06316** 0.06993*** 0.07569*** 0.05398* 
  (0.074) (0.079) (0.085) (0.092) (0.027) (0.026) (0.027) (0.033) 
TOBIN(-1) 0.07988 0.06136 0.05365 -0.03942 -0.01237 -0.01525 0.03184 0.07501 
  (0.072) (0.079) (0.079) (0.072) (0.023) (0.019) (0.045) (0.050) 
TOBIN(-2) -0.06600 -0.06995 -0.05826 -0.03122 -0.01299 -0.00810 -0.07749 -0.07954* 
  (0.062) (0.065) (0.078) (0.069) (0.017) (0.014) (0.048) (0.041) 
LIQUID -0.15560** -0.15848** -0.12548** -0.12877** 0.00031 0.00128 0.01653 0.01632 
  (0.070) (0.061) (0.059) (0.051) (0.011) (0.013) (0.037) (0.037) 
CTI -0.00375 -0.00077 -0.00717 -0.00244 -0.00459** -0.00657*** -0.02493 -0.01527 
  (0.006) (0.009) (0.008) (0.008) (0.002) (0.002) (0.022) (0.015) 
LOAN -0.02743 -0.02986 -0.04341 -0.01236 -0.01190 -0.01991* -0.07850*** -0.09556*** 
  (0.037) (0.044) (0.057) (0.065) (0.009) (0.012) (0.022) (0.026) 
SIZE 0.02217*** 0.02593*** 0.05765*** 0.05731*** -0.00156** -0.00227** -0.00320* -0.00244 
  (0.004) (0.004) (0.010) (0.011) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) 
GROWTH -0.19433 -0.22533 -0.25815 -0.07267 0.11403*** 0.12227*** 0.13452 0.12612 
  (0.202) (0.188) (0.307) (0.298) (0.040) (0.041) (0.149) (0.104) 
MVOL 0.45210** 0.34903 0.62786*** 0.53531** -0.06358** -0.04866 0.02306 0.04509 
  (0.193) (0.226) (0.207) (0.211) (0.031) (0.030) (0.070) (0.079) 
MCAP 0.00694 0.00892* 0.01905*** 0.02302*** -0.00048 -0.00063 -0.00161 -0.00206 
  (0.005) (0.005) (0.007) (0.007) (0.001) (0.001) (0.003) (0.003) 
Observations 1,144 1,145 1140 1140 1132 1132 1,127 1127 
Number of banks 135 136 135 135 136 136 136 136 
p-value of AR(2) 0.093 0.135 0.760 0.694 0.277 0.272 0.333 0.401 
p-value of Hansen-J 0.088 0.076 0.075 0.086 0.088 0.074 0.506 0.586 
 
 
 
 
Table 4. Bank charter value, systemic risk and capitalization: The influence of depth of credit information index 
  SRISK RCOR EQTA CAR 
  
Orthogonal 
Deviation 
First 
Difference 
Orthogonal 
Deviation 
First 
Difference 
Orthogonal 
Deviation 
First 
Difference 
Orthogonal 
Deviation 
First 
Difference 
Dep.var (-1) 0.60044*** 0.49462*** 0.28068*** 0.24446** 0.69812*** 0.52957*** 0.32621* 0.08744 
  (0.065) (0.063) (0.077) (0.106) (0.076) (0.097) (0.185) (0.069) 
TOBIN -0.50671** -0.53560* -1.16987*** -1.03716*** 0.09618 0.12981* -0.34873 -0.30662 
  (0.215) (0.286) (0.378) (0.375) (0.067) (0.068) (0.409) (0.307) 
TOBIN(-1) 0.05584 0.03419 0.04587 -0.04677 -0.01452 -0.01706 0.08223 0.07881 
  (0.071) (0.080) (0.082) (0.075) (0.022) (0.018) (0.085) (0.067) 
TOBIN(-2) -0.00601 -0.00870 -0.03516 -0.02013 -0.02004 -0.01951 -0.13534* -0.09477** 
  (0.064) (0.063) (0.081) (0.071) (0.017) (0.016) (0.077) (0.042) 
TOBIN x CRINDEX 0.07791* 0.07147 0.20347** 0.17557** -0.00775 -0.01540 0.09387 0.08039 
  (0.049) (0.062) (0.085) (0.086) (0.014) (0.014) (0.089) (0.064) 
LIQUID -0.07161 -0.07809 -0.12744* -0.12066** -0.00769 -0.01559 -0.02079 -0.02041 
  (0.060) (0.054) (0.070) (0.055) (0.011) (0.012) (0.016) (0.025) 
CTI -0.00890** -0.00532 -0.00677 -0.00325 -0.00460** -0.00630*** -0.01855 -0.01247 
  (0.004) (0.006) (0.009) (0.008) (0.002) (0.002) (0.014) (0.012) 
LOAN -0.08710** -0.11095*** -0.06735 -0.04645 -0.00575 -0.00689 -0.04703** -0.08626*** 
  (0.036) (0.042) (0.065) (0.074) (0.009) (0.011) (0.021) (0.028) 
SIZE 0.01922*** 0.02350*** 0.05796*** 0.05803*** -0.00137* -0.00176* -0.00241 0.00024 
  (0.004) (0.004) (0.011) (0.012) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) 
GROWTH -0.00763 0.01892 -0.33197 -0.03778 0.09371** 0.08561* -0.06583 -0.02755 
  (0.181) (0.168) (0.290) (0.292) (0.043) (0.044) (0.120) (0.086) 
MVOL 0.00585*** 0.00502** 0.00715*** 0.00591*** -0.00083*** -0.00081*** 0.00106 0.00007 
  (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) 
MCAP -0.00128 0.00010 0.01244* 0.01654** 0.00066 0.00158 -0.00348 -0.00105 
  (0.004) (0.004) (0.007) (0.007) (0.001) (0.001) (0.004) (0.003) 
CRINDEX -0.05391 -0.04258 -0.20304** -0.17085* 0.00459 0.00912 -0.10536 -0.09228 
  (0.051) (0.064) (0.092) (0.092) (0.015) (0.015) (0.093) (0.066) 
Observations 1,144 1144 1140 1140 1,132 1132 1127 1127 
Number of banks 135 135 135 135 136 136 136 136 
p-value of AR(2) 0.083 0.145 0.731 0.703 0.290 0.277 0.343 0.234 
p-value of Hansen-J 0.102 0.102 0.066 0.069 0.069 0.073 0.060 0.666 
 
 
Table 5. Bank charter value, systemic risk and capitalization: The influence of credit information coverage by private credit bureaus 
  SRISK RCOR EQTA CAR 
  
Orthogonal 
Deviation 
First 
Difference 
Orthogonal 
Deviation 
First 
Difference 
Orthogonal 
Deviation 
First 
Difference 
Orthogonal 
Deviation 
First 
Difference 
Dep.var (-1) 0.37144*** 0.38382*** 0.32086*** 0.26174** 0.59629*** 0.54145*** 0.23770 0.11688 
  (0.057) (0.062) (0.080) (0.106) (0.100) (0.106) (0.164) (0.093) 
TOBIN -0.21662*** -0.18043*** -0.28297** -0.33550*** 0.04635* 0.05480** 0.06498 0.03428 
  (0.063) (0.068) (0.111) (0.118) (0.025) (0.023) (0.047) (0.054) 
TOBIN(-1) 0.00637 -0.01653 0.04090 -0.03069 -0.00446 0.00183 0.03333 0.07489 
  (0.063) (0.066) (0.086) (0.075) (0.016) (0.013) (0.048) (0.051) 
TOBIN(-2) 0.01794 -0.00966 -0.04340 -0.01734 -0.01491 -0.02336 -0.08318 -0.09574 
  (0.050) (0.047) (0.084) (0.070) (0.015) (0.011) (0.052) (0.047) 
TOBIN x PRIVBUR 0.56833** 0.40149* 0.71060** 0.61169* -0.10160** -0.12267*** -0.06781 -0.04044 
  (0.265) (0.285) (0.305) (0.349) (0.049) (0.045) (0.076) (0.088) 
LIQUID -0.09133** -0.09836*** -0.08970* -0.09536** -0.00253 -0.00330 0.00165 0.00187 
  (0.044) (0.034) (0.054) (0.046) (0.012) (0.011) (0.029) (0.034) 
CTI -0.01054** -0.00943* -0.01157 -0.00645 -0.00684** -0.00528** -0.02607 -0.01750 
  (0.005) (0.005) (0.007) (0.007) (0.003) (0.002) (0.020) (0.017) 
LOAN -0.07219* -0.06984* -0.09957* -0.05744 -0.01094 -0.00829 -0.07781*** -0.08945*** 
  (0.040) (0.039) (0.056) (0.068) (0.010) (0.011) (0.028) (0.027) 
SIZE 0.02799*** 0.02767*** 0.05413*** 0.05667*** -0.00089 -0.00106 -0.00270 -0.00166 
  (0.005) (0.005) (0.011) (0.011) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) 
GROWTH 0.52649*** 0.37456** 0.14878 0.11650 0.00533 0.02797 0.02318 0.00043 
  (0.185) (0.161) (0.291) (0.281) (0.031) (0.028) (0.091) (0.075) 
MVOL 0.00771*** 0.00673*** 0.00715*** 0.00638*** -0.00104*** -0.00093*** -0.00005 -0.00006 
  (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) 
MCAP -0.02085*** -0.01702** -0.00638 0.00258 0.00414** 0.00491*** 0.00186 0.00248 
  (0.006) (0.007) (0.009) (0.008) (0.002) (0.002) (0.004) (0.004) 
PRIVBUR -0.39757 -0.25067 -0.62242** -0.54399 0.08134* 0.10027** 0.05001 0.01303 
  (0.257) (0.277) (0.307) (0.350) (0.045) (0.043) (0.078) (0.091) 
Observations 1144 1144 1140 1140 1132 1132 1,127 1127 
Number of banks 135 135 135 135 136 136 136 136 
p-value of AR(2) 0.198 0.179 0.915 0.779 0.277 0.274 0.283 0.295 
p-value of Hansen-J 0.197 0.270 0.074 0.087 0.781 0.592 0.408 0.407 
 
 
Table 5. Bank charter value, systemic risk and capitalization: The influence of credit information coverage by public credit registries 
  SRISK RCOR EQTA CAR 
  
Orthogonal 
Deviation 
First 
Difference 
Orthogonal 
Deviation 
First 
Difference 
Orthogonal 
Deviation 
First 
Difference 
Orthogonal 
Deviation 
First 
Difference 
Dep.var (-1) 0.62723*** 0.54603*** 0.60531*** 0.47320*** 0.75794*** 0.61708*** 0.21394 0.11755 
  (0.059) (0.053) (0.051) (0.064) (0.058) (0.080) (0.155) (0.090) 
TOBIN -0.14129 -0.20234** -0.06128 -0.15363 0.04966** 0.05109** 0.06945* 0.01255 
  (0.097) (0.102) (0.100) (0.101) (0.024) (0.024) (0.042) (0.057) 
TOBIN(-1) 0.07865 0.05231 0.04821 -0.00262 -0.01128 -0.01404 0.03760 0.08193 
  (0.072) (0.078) (0.089) (0.079) (0.023) (0.020) (0.048) (0.053) 
TOBIN(-2) -0.06180 -0.05434 -0.01120 0.02760 -0.01359 -0.00809 -0.07477* -0.07989** 
  (0.060) (0.065) (0.092) (0.079) (0.018) (0.014) (0.043) (0.039) 
TOBIN x PUBREG -0.09310 0.02779 0.17622 0.33449 0.10464 0.13757 0.09813 0.29743 
  (0.316) (0.357) (0.352) (0.408) (0.093) (0.104) (0.235) (0.233) 
LIQUID -0.15439** -0.14579** -0.12189** -0.10800** 0.00134 0.00294 0.01098 0.01989 
  (0.067) (0.058) (0.051) (0.044) (0.011) (0.014) (0.032) (0.036) 
CTI -0.00443 -0.00269 -0.01517* -0.01112 -0.00453** -0.00648*** -0.02178 -0.01640 
  (0.006) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.002) (0.002) (0.017) (0.014) 
LOAN -0.02020 -0.01483 -0.02195 -0.02761 -0.01164 -0.01867 -0.08025*** -0.09576*** 
  (0.038) (0.045) (0.047) (0.054) (0.009) (0.012) (0.025) (0.023) 
SIZE 0.02110*** 0.02429*** 0.02789*** 0.03615*** -0.00165** -0.00238** -0.00306* -0.00216 
  (0.004) (0.004) (0.005) (0.007) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) 
GROWTH -0.03242 -0.03996 0.23702 0.36596 0.12933*** 0.13832*** 0.15277 0.10860 
  (0.216) (0.192) (0.244) (0.279) (0.039) (0.039) (0.126) (0.088) 
MVOL 0.00476** 0.00413* 0.00687*** 0.00745*** -0.00053* -0.00034 0.00021 0.00039 
  (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) 
MCAP 0.00394 0.00519 0.00250 0.00174 -0.00062 -0.00051 -0.00153 -0.00133 
  (0.004) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.001) (0.001) (0.004) (0.003) 
PUBREG 0.00550 -0.15361 -0.46447 -0.73343 -0.11939 -0.15280 -0.10408 -0.30328 
  (0.342) (0.388) (0.385) (0.443) (0.100) (0.112) (0.238) (0.242) 
Observations 1144 1144 1140 1140 1,132 1132 1127 1127 
Number of banks 135 145 135 135 136 136 136 136 
p-value of AR(2) 0.087 0.127 0.676 0.869 0.250 0.231 0.367 0.322 
p-value of Hansen-J 0.056 0.023 0.114 0.155 0.055 0.088 0.431 0.564 
 
 
 
